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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
 By Susan J. Cavan  
 
PRESIDENCY 
Dogs of war? 
Speaking off the cuff in front of foreign media reporters, President Yel'tsin issued 
what appeared to be a stern warning to the United States over its Iraq policy: "By 
his actions, Clinton might run into a world war. He is acting too loudly." (Interfax, 
4 Feb 98; BBC at news.bbc.co.uk) 
 
As journalists sought clarification of Yel'tsin's statement, they speculated on a 
possible Russian defense of Iraq in the event of an American attack. In a rush to 
squelch international concern over the remarks, Presidential Spokesman Sergei 
Yastrzhembsky described the journalists' interpretation of Yel'tsin's statement as 
"ridiculous and absurd." Yastrzhembsky did not, however, offer his own spin on 
the president's intended message. Given Yel'tsin's propensity for hyperbole when 
departing from prepared texts, particularly in front of foreign audiences, it seems 
likely that Yastrzhembsky will concentrate his attention on keeping the president 
and his staff on the same page. 
 
Yel'tsin rules out 2000 presidential bid 
While it may be much too early to accept President Yel'tsin's latest statements as 
the final word on this subject, Yel'tsin has announced that he will not seek re-
election in the year 2000. He has also suggested that he, yet again, has a 
potential successor in mind. At this point, Yel'tsin's new chosen heir remains 




Presidential review of death sentences 
Hailed as a step "towards the abolition of the death penalty," President Yel'tsin 
will now review every death sentence handed down, regardless of clemency 
appeals by the convict. The mechanism of presidential review is an apparent 
attempt to reconcile disparate elements of the judicial system in the wake of 
Russian accession to the Council of Europe's protocol on abolition of the death 
penalty. While there has been a moratorium on executions in Russia since 
August 1996, the courts have continued to allow the imposition of death 
sentences. (ITAR-TASS, 11 Jan 98; FBIS-SOV-98-012) 
 
APPARAT 
Presidential staff substantially changed? 
Despite the absence of a presidential decree outlining yet another restructuring 
of the apparat, there have apparently been significant changes to the structure 
and influence of presidential advisers. Chief of Staff Valentin Yumashev has 
reportedly managed to sideline several former close Yel'tsin advisers, without 
resort to official presidential approval of the reshuffle. In addition to the long-time 
assistants formally fired last year, Satarov and Ryurikov, also lost in the shuffle 
are Yevgeni Shaposhnikov, Boris Kuzyk, Mikhail Krasnov and Anatoli 
Korabelshchikov. (Komsomol'skaya pravda, 13 Jan 98; FBIS-SOV-98-013) 
 
Yevgeni Savostyanov, deputy chief of the Presidential Staff in charge of 
personnel matters, has also announced a ten percent reduction in staff 
personnel, which is asserted to be a dismissal of 200 staffers. Savostyanov's 
explanation for the cuts focused on financial, not ideological issues: "In 1997 due 
to certain decisions, we expanded beyond the limits set by the budget." (Interfax, 
19 Jan 98; FBIS-SOV-98-019) 
 
SECURITY COUNCIL 
Chechen policy again highlights leadership rifts 
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MVD Chief Anatoli Kulikov's recent calls for "preventive strikes against bandit 
bases" in Chechnya has provoked a strong dissenting reaction from Security 
Council Secretary Ivan Rybkin. (ITAR-TASS, 6 Jan 98: FBIS-SOV-98-006) 
Rybkin, stressing adherence to the president's approach to a resolution of the 
Chechen situation ("peace, territorial integrity and great patience"), complained 
that "some people still want to solve problems facing the Chechen Republic by 
old methods used by Bolsheviks--everything and at once." (ITAR-TASS, 7 Jan 
98; FBIS-SOV-98-007) 
 
Ramazan Abdulatipov, who heads up the Russian government's Commission for 
the Stabilization of the Socioeconomic Situation in Chechnya, has been 
conducting negotiations in Chechnya throughout its recent formation of a new 
government. While Abdulatipov has refrained from direct comment on the 
Kulikov-Rybkin split, he has remarked upon the perennial problem of lack of 
implementation of presidential and governmental orders concerning Chechnya. 
(ITAR-TASS, 10 Jan 98; FBIS-SOV-98-012) Among the recommendations 
Abdulatipov is prepared to present to the President on the Chechen/North 
Caucasus situation is a proposal for the establishment of a committee within the 




Urinson blamed for sluggish arms sales 
Economics Minister Yakov Urinson, who assumed oversight of arms sales after 
last year's reform and restructuring of Rosvooruzhenie and the Ministry of 
Defense Industry, has come under attack in a recent article in Moskovsky 
komsomolets (14 Jan 98; FBIS-SOV-98-015) for alleged losses of arms sales of 
"more than $1 billion." 
 
While purportedly an investigation of recent shortfalls in sales expectations, the 
MK article focuses on Urinson's role in the removal of arms sales authority from 
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the presidential apparat and, specifically, the undercutting of the former 
Rosvooruzhenie chief Aleksandr Kotelkin. The unflattering portrayal of Urinson's 
stewardship vis-a-vis Kotelkin's suggests a strong personal motive for this 
journalistic attack. 
 
Chernomyrdin health rumors confirmed by events? 
Anatoli Chubais chaired a government meeting in mid-January, which set off 
rumors that Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin was ill and recuperating at the 
Barvikha Sanatorium. (NTV, 15 Jan 98; FBIS-SOV-98-015) While later 
developments appeared to refute the PM's health rumors, it has recently been 
announced that Chernomyrdin has taken a vacation and will spend at least some 
of his time at the sanitarium. (RFE/RL Newsline, 2 Feb 98) 
 
Russian analysts are notoriously, and quite understandably, sensitive to potential 
health crises, nonetheless the state of the prime minister's health could well be 
an important variable in the current leadership conflicts, especially if 
Chernomyrdin is the chosen successor Yel'tsin has in mind.  
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By John McDonough and Mark Jones 
 
Primakov opposes force in Iraqi inspection problems 
Russia opposes any use of force to settle the problems concerning the work of 
inspectors, Primakov said during his telephone talk with US Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright on 13 January. The telephone conversation was initiated by 
Albright. Primakov emphasized the need for full cooperation between Iraq and 
the UN special commission, Russian foreign ministry spokesman Valeri 
Nesterushkin stated on 14 January. (Interfax, 1351 GMT, 14 Jan 98; FBIS-SOV-
98-014) 
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Primakov stated in a news conference the following week that Russia is in favor 
of Iraq fulfilling the UN Security Council resolutions, commenting that it was 
essential for Iraq to comply. However, he noted Russia's opposition to the use of 
strong-arm methods, which he said were counterproductive. Primakov said there 
was a whole arsenal of possibilities for exerting additional pressure, including 
more effective work by the special commission." (ITAR-TASS World Service, 
1659 GMT, 20 Jan 98; FBIS-SOV-98-020) 
 
A new dimension to Baltic-Russian relations 
Moscow raised questions and concerns over the US-Baltic charter signed in 
Washington on 16 January, indicating that the new agreement might alter 
existing relationships with Europe and NATO. 
 
The Russian side declares "with total certainty" that if the issue of the Baltic 
states' admission into NATO becomes a reality, Russia will inevitably have to 
revise its relations with the alliance, foreign ministry spokesman Gennadi 
Tarasov told a briefing in Moscow Tuesday. Russia "takes note" of the 
explanation that the charter is not legally binding, he said. "At the same time, 
comments by the signatories are full of words about the United States' 
commitment to aid in the admission of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia to NATO, 
although it was said previously that the issue of the Baltic states' acceptance into 
the Alliance is not on the agenda. (Interfax, 1259 GMT, 20 Jan 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
020) 
 
Russia hopes that the charter between the US and the Baltic countries "will not 
bring negative elements into Europe's system of interaction appearing in the 
process of working out a general and universal model of security," foreign 
ministry spokesman Valeri Nesterushkin said at a briefing in Moscow prior to the 
signing of the Partnership Charter. Russia's attitude to this document will depend 
on "its consistency in ensuring open, equal and good-neighborly ties in the 
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Baltics as a part of constructing a new Europe without division lines," 
Nesterushkin said. (FBIS-SOV-98-015) 
 
Prior to the signing of the new charter, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister 
Alexander Avdeev noted that positive changes have taken shape in Russian-
Baltic relations; however, the process of clearing the obstacles of the past and 
mutual confidence-building needs to be continued. These comments came while 
concluding a working tour of the Baltics. The conversations centered on the 
Russian president's proposals to strengthen trust and stability in the Baltics and 
his proposal to cut unilaterally the armed forces in northwestern Russia by 40 
percent. (Rossiyskaya gazeta, 14 Jan 98, p. 7; FBIS-SOV-98-014) 
 
Kovalev on challenges facing Federal Security Service  
The director of Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB), Nikolai Kovalev, 
reported that his service has information on a number of international 
organizations purposefully interfering in Russia' s domestic life. "A new and not 
always favorable geopolitical and international situation for Russia has emerged," 
he said. According to Kovalev, negative processes in the Russian economy 
constitute a serious threat to national security. These processes are aggravated 
by the centrifugal aspirations of Russian territories, which increase the threat to 
the territorial integrity of the country. National separatism is increasing, and 
favorable conditions have appeared for ethnic conflicts. "Today this is one of the 
biggest threats," he said. (Interfax, 1613 GMT, 19 Jan 98; FBIS-SOV-98-020) 
 
Moscow glad Bosnian Serbs form constitutional executive 
Russia is satisfied with the creation of constitutional executive power bodies in 
the Bosnian Serb Republic, spokesman for the Russian Foreign Ministry Gennadi 
Tarasov said at a briefing in Moscow on 20 January when commenting on the 
election of a new Bosnian Serb government led by the chairman of the 
Independent Social-Democratic Party, Milorad Dodik. (ITAR-TASS 1434 GMT 20 
Jan 98; FBIS-SOV-98-020) 
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US efforts for Middle East peace settlement welcomed 
As a co-sponsor of the peace process in the Middle East, Russia welcomes any 
constructive efforts to overcome the impasse in the peace process, including 
efforts by the other co-sponsor, the United States, according to Russian Foreign 
Ministry spokesman Gennadi Tarasov. Moscow believes that concerted actions--
by Russia, the United States and other countries--that can influence the situation 
in the Middle East constructively are needed to overcome the impasse in the 
Mideast peace process, the spokesman said at a briefing. (Interfax, 1603 GMT, 
20 Jan 98; FBIS-SOV-98-020) 
 
Space agency director to discuss technology export with US 
US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Director-General of the Russian 
Space Agency Yuri Koptev were scheduled to discuss the US and Russian 
stands on observing the export procedures for rocket technologies during 
Koptev's visit to the US last month. Koptev arrived in the US capital to sign an 
agreement on the international space station and a memorandum of 
implementing the intergovernmental agreement with NASA. (ITAR-TASS, 0932 
GMT, 27 Jan 98; FBIS-SOV-98-027) 
 
New interest in North Korea noted 
Foreign Minister Yevgeni Primakov said he will soon visit North Korea to "confirm 
Russia's interests on the Korean peninsula and its commitment to detente and 
settlement of relations between the South and the North." Foreign ministry official 
Aman Irgebaev followed by saying that Russia is trying to restore its previous 
positions in North Korea and the region as a whole and to establish a balancing 
in relations between Pyongyang and Seoul (ITAR-TASS, 21 Jan 98; FBIS-SOV-
98-021). In a related story, Russian Ambassador to North Korea Valeri Denisov 
said a new treaty outlining the basic principles of relations between Russia and 
North Korea is actively being developed by both countries. According to the 
ambassador, top priorities of the treaty are invigorating political contacts between 
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Moscow and Pyongyang and a joint search for ways to expand cooperation in 
economic and other fields (ITAR-TASS, 21 Jan 98; FBIS-SOV-98-021). 
 
High-level talks produce a commission 
Japan and Russia agreed to set up a joint commission aimed at securing a 
bilateral peace treaty. The commission will be chaired by the foreign ministers of 
the two countries. The agreement was reached during the first round of 
negotiations called for in the November 1997 presidential agreement, which laid 
out plans for the two countries to sign a peace treaty by the year 2000 (Kyodo, 
22 Jan 98; FBIS-EAS-98-022). 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Michael Thurman 
 
REGIONAL ELECTIONS 
Ryzhkov: No 'Red Belt' seen developing 
Assessing the results of the 14 December 1997 elections held in seven Russian 
regions (Novosibirsk, Krasnoyarsk, Tomsk, Vladimir, Smolensk, Tambov, and 
Kaliningrad), State Duma First Vice Speaker Vladimir Ryzhkov claimed that the 
popular view that "Red belts" have almost encircled the entire country is untrue. 
The communist parties were routed in each region. According to Ryzhkov, the 
seemingly common belief that political parties play no real role in the society and 
politics of contemporary Russia is similarly false and therefore must be the 
invention of sociologists. In evidence, Ryzhkov points to the fact that the NDR 
has established factions in 23 regional assemblies and hopes that by the end of 
the year that number will increase to 30-35. (Rossiyskaya gazeta, Dom i 
Otechestvo Supplement, 20-26 Dec 97, p. 1; FBIS-SOV-97-356) 
'Industrial lobby' wins Tomsk elections 
 9 
In accordance with the old adage that he who owns the gold makes the rules, 
virtually all seats in the Tomsk regional Duma have gone to representatives of 
the industrial lobby--that is, candidates with no party affiliation and who are 
connected to industry and banking. For example, the president of the Eastern Oil 
Company, Leonid Filimonov, and the company's vice president, Viktor Kalyuzhny 
were elected regional Duma deputies. 
 
An interesting question may be raised as to why these busy industrial executives 
should choose to sit in the regional Duma themselves, rather than seat a front-
man (or woman). Is it the perks of office, the lack of trustworthy drones, or an 
absence of respect for maintaining a discreet distance between public and 
private interests? Perhaps this is not surprising given that, with so much 
emphasis being placed on the beneficence of the marketplace, voters would 
believe that there is, and more importantly should be, no effective difference 
between politics and business. (Radio Rossii Network, 0400 GMT, 22 Dec 97; 
FBIS-SOV-97-356) 
 
Common sense said to win in Tambov 
As with the recent election results in Tomsk, independent businessmen defeated 
party candidates and won a majority of seats in the new Tambov regional Duma. 
Even the Russian Communist party winners, who won 13 out of the 50 seats up 
for election, are businessmen and not ideologues. Local newspapers hailed the 
election of "pragmatic" deputies who understand that the region will be saved by 
economic development and not party slogans. Interestingly enough, the elections 
in both Tomsk and Tambov belie the assertion of State Duma Vice Speaker 
Vladimir Ryzhkov that political parties are of great importance in Russian 
elections (see above). At least on the local level, voters seem to trust in the 
restorative powers of local business acumen rather than national party promises. 




Duma amnesty will release 35,000 convicts 
About 35,000 convicts will be released in Russia in compliance with an amnesty 
resolution passed by the Russian State Duma. The sentences of another 
400,000 people will be either shortened or dropped if people indicted [sic] got a 
suspended sentence or were sentenced to punishment in other forms without 
imprisonment. [ISCIP note: I infer from the discussion of sentencing, that an 
"indicted" prisoner is in fact a "convicted" one; but given the state of the Russian 
court system, this inference might prove to be unfounded.] 
 
The amnesty applies to pensioners, including men over 60 years of age and 
women over 50, persons who served in the army or took part in fighting to defend 
the Motherland or received state awards, invalids and people suffering from 
tuberculosis in a contagious form, adolescents who were sentenced to 
imprisonment of up to three years but were never indicted [sic] earlier, women 
imprisoned for a term of five years and who had served no less than a third of 
their prison sentence and people indicted [sic] for a term of three years for crimes 
committed as a result of carelessness. 
 
The amnesty does not apply to people indicted [sic] for premeditated murder, 
severe violence, robbery, large-scale thefts, fraud, abuse of office, high treason, 
or subversive and terrorist acts. The amnesty does not apply to dangerous 
recidivists [sic], people indicted [sic] for violent crimes more than once, and those 
who had been amnestied earlier and were again convicted of another offense. 
 
The purpose of this amnesty is to relieve pressure on the severely overcrowded 
and under-funded Russian prison system. The amnesty is also a result of the 
malformed Russian legal system, the workings of which are often politically 
motivated, operating with laws that are often contradictory and/or vague, and 
"proceeding" absent any clear direction from the highest courts. Broad amnesties 
granted by the legislative branch can only be temporary and should not be relied 
upon to correct, or even ameliorate, the poor showings of a chaotic and 
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insufficient judicial system. Correcting legislation is required. Such amnesties 
only work against the construction of a Russian society based upon the objective 
rule of law and support the bad old habits of legal capriciousness of the central 
authorities. (ITAR-TASS, 1956 GMT, 24 Dec 97; FBIS-SOV-97-358) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Lt. Col. Dwyer Dennis and CDR Curtis Stevens 
 
Russian helicopter industry struggles to survive in a free market 
During a recent review of the M.L. Mil General Design Bureau, which is marking 
its fiftieth anniversary, a recent Rossiyskaya gazeta article highlighted many of 
the current challenges of the helicopter industry. The overriding problem seems 
to be that during the Soviet period, two design teams, Mil and Kamov, were 
strongly subsidized and production was kept at very high rates. But today, there 
is neither the domestic nor foreign market to support such plant capacity. Since 
its inception Mil has developed, tested, and produced 12 basic types and more 
than 100 modifications. Approximately 30,000 helicopters have been produced, 
with more than 7,000 sold abroad. One solution considered is to convert aircraft 
construction to a commercial basis. The article points out that, even under the 
most favorable conditions, it takes five to seven years just to develop an aircraft, 
not counting production and marketing--far too long for businessmen expecting 
quick returns on investment. (Rossiyskaya gazeta, 4 Jan 98; FBIS-SOV-98-007). 
While this transition occurs, workers go unpaid. The Mil design bureau's biggest 
customer, the army, is making the tough choice also. Strapped for cash, military 
leaders must choose between buying helicopters and feeding troops. In the west, 
the purchase of 30-40 helicopters per year was considered good, but Mil was 
accustomed to 300-400. Production is nearly at a standstill today. 
 
Two other situations compound the uneasiness in the industry: privatization and 
resources. Six months ago, foreign ownership of the Mil Design Bureau was 
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about 14 percent; now it amounts to 35 percent, greater than the government's 
holdings. (NTV, 1900 GMT, 19 Jan 98; FBIS-SOV-98-019) The resource 
challenge is a function of the distributed nature of the production process. The 
article provides a clear example, the Mil-26 helicopter, which is built in Rostov. 
The main rotor blade construction relies on a special composite called Nomex 
which was previously supplied by a small enterprise in Kazakhstan. With the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, the plant was shut down. Now the Rostov plant 
must purchase the material abroad with very limited foreign currency coffers and 
may logically impact the competitive pricing that government subsidies afforded 
in the past. (Rossiyskaya gazeta, 4 Jan 98; FBIS-SOV-98-007) 
 
The Soviet Union's defense industry was very distributed across the board, so 
the resource situation is by no means unique. However, the overwhelming 
capacity and competing design bureaus will make a successful transition very 
difficult. On the other hand, there has been some success: Recently at a Rzhev 
military enterprise in the Tver region, a new commercial two-seat helicopter has 
been designed, tested, and first two units manufactured within 18 months 
through a collaboration between Tver businessmen and the military enterprise. 
(ITAR-TASS, 1530 GMT, 17 Jan 98; FBIS-SOV-98-017) Mil may also find that 
the foreign ownership may be in the bureau's best interest. Out of the 35 percent 
of shares held by foreign investors, approximately 10 percent are held by 
Sikorsky, a major US competitor. Such ownership may indeed lead to unique 
strategic partnering as the article described a joint development program 
currently underway between the two. (Rossiyskaya gazeta, 4 Jan 98; FBIS-SOV-
98-007) 
 
Russia tests three new aircraft 
Inspite of continued budgetary woes, Russia continues to develop and test new 
aircraft. NTV released footage of the first flight of the Sukhoi Su-34 taking place 
in Novosibirsk. The Su-34 is a long-range fighter-bomber reported to have the 
most modern aerodynamics and possessing some "stealth" characteristics. 
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(NTV, 1900 GMT, 3 Jan 98; FBIS-SOV-98-008) Meanwhile, testing continues on 
the Su-37 "the inverse sweptback wing design" (forward-swept) fifth-generation 
combat aircraft. Its design characteristics include supersonic capability and 
"stealth" and is planned to oppose the US F-22 Raptor. (Komsomol'skaya 
pravda, 17 Jan 98; FBIS-SOV-98-020) The third aircraft in development and 
testing is a new MiG-29 variant, the SMT. The MiG-29 SMT's main distinguishing 
features from previous MiG-29 multipurpose fighters are a new cockpit design 
and an increased flight range. Modifications include the latest avionics and radar 
functionality, doubled maximum ordinance payload, a dismountable aerial 
refueling system, and a potential unrefueled flight range of 3,500 km. 
(Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozerniye, 5-18 Dec 97; FBIS-SOV-98-012) 
 
Sergeev visits France 
Defense Minister Igor Sergeev completed a four-day visit to France on 17 
January. Although no agreements were expected to be signed with the French, 
both sides agreed to expand their working groups with emphasis placed on 
space and aviation cooperation. Additionally military exercises at the company 
level have been scheduled in Russia and France for 1998 and 1999. The 
highlight of Sergeev's first official visit to France was a tour of the French Navy's 
SSBN base near Brest. (ITAR-TASS, 1956 GMT, 17 Jan 98; FBIS-SOV-98-017) 
 
Decree designed to improve coordination on space systems 
President Yel'tsin issued a degree on 20 January on the improvement of military 
and civilian applications of the Russian military space industry. Russian Defense 
Council Secretary Andrei Kokoshin briefed reporters that the purpose of the 
degree was to "coordinate between the Defense Ministry and the Russian Space 
Agency the policy in the field of application of military and dual-purpose space 
systems." (ITAR-TASS, 1309 GMT, 20 Jan 98; FBIS-SOV-98-020) 
 
While the military and civilian space agencies may have reached a bureaucratic 
agreement of the future of Russian space policy, the general director of the 
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Russian Space Agency, Yuri Koptev, said on 23 January that 72% of Russian 
military and civilian satellites were past their operational life. The condition of 
military and civilian satellites "is equal and explained by a small size of the state 
support." Koptev went on to say "reformed armed forces and reformed Russia 
cannot exist without a corresponding space activity." (ITAR-TASS, 1437 GMT, 23 
Jan 98; FBIS-SOV-98-023) 
 
487 military suicides in 1997 
Chief Military Prosecutor Yuri Demin announced that suicides accounted for 487 
out of the 1103 non-combat deaths in the Russian military in 1997. Demin 
blamed draft commissions on the high rate since they often admit conscripts who 
"suffer from chronic and psychiatric illnesses." (RFE/RL Newsline, 23 Jan 98) 
 
Meanwhile, on 27 January a soldier at a remote outpost on Sakhalin Island shot 
and killed six other privates and a warrant officer. The soldier was quickly 
apprehended and was reported as telling investigators he had been brutally 
hazed by one of the soldiers he killed. But Colonel-General Mikhail Klishin, a 
deputy chief of the General Staff, has a different explanation for the killings. He 
said the conscript responsible had been sniffing acetone and was a known 
substance abuser. The general went on to say the conscript had a police record. 
In 1997 there were 80 shooting incidents at guard posts with 36 fatalities. 
(Jamestown Foundation Monitor, 29 Jan 98) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: CIS 
By Mark Jones 
 
Yel'tsin trying to reinvigorate commonwealth 
President Boris Yel'tsin has been raising the visibility of CIS relations in his own 
country as well as other member states. In addition to declaring 1998 "The Year 
of the CIS," Yel'tsin recently stated that, "A very active period in the work of the 
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CIS is now beginning." Why the sudden emphasis on the commonwealth? 
Perhaps the reason is revealed in the second half of Yel'tsin's statement: 
"Summing up the results of 1997, we can say outright that the CIS was 
jeopardized...some countries were ready to withdraw (from the commonwealth)" 
(ITAR-TASS, 20 Jan 98; FBIS-SOV-98-020). 
 
Comment 
The Chisinau summit apparently shook Yel'tsin more than first seemed evident. 
Second only to the president's domestic agenda is his desire to maintain Russian 
hegemony in the former Soviet space--minus the Baltics. Reintegration--political, 
military, and economic--is Russia's goal. If this was ever questioned, elements of 
the recently published National Security Concept erase all doubts. Chisinau 
opened Yel'tsin's eyes to just how far Russia's former clients have strayed--and 
Russia views this drift as a threat to its national security. Yel'tsin's statements 
indicate the beginning of a trend and a redoubling of Russian efforts to bring the 
"near abroad" back into the fold. Expect more of the same in the coming months. 
 
New CIS peacekeeping commander appointed 
The council of CIS defense ministers have appointed Major General Sergei 
Korobko as the new commander of the CIS collective peacekeeping forces in 
Georgia. Korobko is 50 years old and is being transferred from Russia's Main 
Military Inspectorate. He was born in North Ossetia and has served in 
Azerbaijan. In his first official statement, the new commander reminded 
observers that the peacekeepers' oft-renewed mandate expires on 31 January 
and called for yet another extension (Radio Rossii Network, 1400 GMT, 19 Jan 
98; FBIS-UMA-98-019, and NTV, 1300 GMT, 20 Jan 98; FBIS-UMA-98-020). 
 
Move toward economic integration continues 
Leaders of the CIS Group of Four (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) 
held a summit in late January and moved closer to forming a customs union. 
President Nazerbaev of Kazakhstan, the leader of the group's economic 
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committee, proposed that the final version of the treaty on creating a single 
economic space between the four countries should be modeled on the European 
Union system (Interfax, 22 Jan 98; FBIS-SOV-98-022). For its part, Russia 
continues to operate its "customs academy" to train CIS officials. How can the 
training at the academy be characterized? According to NTV correspondent 
Aleksandr Ostrovsky, "Despite the fact that half of the academy's students are 
representatives of the weaker sex, military discipline reigns here. The training 
course even includes karate just in case a criminal needs to be dealt with more 
firmly" (NTV, 1600 GMT, 24 Jan 98; FBIS-SOV-98-024). 
 
On newsstands soon: CIS Today 
Members of the Council of CIS State News Agencies, under the chairmanship of 
ITAR-TASS General Director Vitali Ignatenko, drew up a draft convention on the 
status of CIS correspondents working in other member countries. Among other 
things, the draft calls for preferential conditions and eased accreditation 
procedures for journalists in other commonwealth states. The draft will now go 
forward to the Council of Heads of State for approval. Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, 
and Ukraine did not sign the agreement. Valery Talkachow, head of the 
Belarusian president's press service, called for the creation of a single CIS 
newspaper as well as a single radio and television channel. According to 
Talkachow, if the Heads of State do not adopt the convention, there will be no 
reform of the CIS (Rossiyskiye vesti, 13 Jan 98; FBIS-SOV-98-014). That is an 
interesting concept: setting up a press organization to achieve a political goal. 
Perhaps the Belarusian does not grasp the idea of a free, independent press. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tracy Gerstle 
 
MOLDOVA 
Tiraspol-Chisinau negotiations stalled 
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The Joint Control Commission (JCC), a tripartite group consisting of Moldova, 
Transdniestr officials and Russia, has not convened for the past two months. 
Tiraspol has refused to work with Vitalie Bruma (a deputy in the Interior Ministry, 
who was recently appointed to the JCC by Moldovan President Petru Lucinschi) 
due to his chastisement of Transdniestr authorities in the media. (RFE/RL 
Newsline, 21 Jan 98) 
 
Tiraspol's representatives failed to appear for a 22 January meeting, at which the 
three sides were purportedly to draft a document that would bring a resolution to 
the conflict. (Basapress, 1750 GMT, 22 Jan 98; FBIS-SOV-98-022) Currently the 
peacekeeping corps patrolling the security zone is under no one's control and 
there is speculation that Tiraspol will take over the area. (Basapress, 1757 GMT, 
21 Jan 98; FBIS-SOV-98-021) 
 
Talks also have been hindered by Moldova's upcoming parliamentary elections in 
March. Anatol Taranu, Chisinau's head negotiator and a special advisor to 
President Lucinschi, is planning to run for a seat with the newly formed Speranta 
bloc. The bloc is a social-democratic group of parties, including the United Social 
Democratic Party of Moldova (PSDUM) and the Movement of Professionals, 
whose platform is "pro-presidential." (Infotag, 1717 GMT, 13 Jan 98; FBIS-SOV-
98-013) With elections only ten weeks away, Taranu said he may be reluctant to 
restart the talks, since they would take away from his time on the campaign trail. 
 
Lucinschi in Brussels 
Lucinschi met with NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana on 26 January. The 
two agreed to expand further Moldova's role in the US Partnership for Peace 
program and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. However, Lucinschi stressed 
that this new role would not harm relations with Russia. He said that Moldova is 
still a "neutral country and pursues a policy of non-alignment with military blocs." 
(ITAR-TASS, 1523 GMT, 26 Jan 98; FBIS-SOV-98-026) 
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Chemical weapons removed to Lvov to be destroyed 
When Russian troops deployed in the Dniestr region were withdrawn in July 
1997, they left 200 tons of toxins behind, including dichloroethane (a degasifying 
agent) and over 40,000 tons of munitions. Dniestr authorities have been reluctant 
to let these armaments go, requesting that they be split 50:50 with Russia. 
However, in mid-January they cited the 1992 Russo-Moldovan agreement, which 
called for the withdrawal of all Russian military equipment in the region, and 
demanded that the chemicals be removed. All the chemicals will be sent to the 





The Statistics Committee reported that the country's population decreased by 
415,000, out of a total of 50.5 million. Officials cited a high mortality rate and 
migration as the primary factors of the decline. (ITAR-TASS, 1733 GMT, 6 Jan 
98; FBIS-TAC-98-023) 
 
This was coupled by an announcement from Ukraine's Pulmonary Institute that 
tuberculosis rates have reached epidemic proportions. From 1990 to 1996 the 
rate of infection increased 45.1 percent. Currently 45.8 Ukrainians per 100,000 
have the disease. Experts contribute the rise to spoiled food and poor medical 
care. (Intelnews, 0116 GMT, 20 Jan 98; FBIS-SOV-98-020) 
 
No reductions planned in the Army or the Navy despite budget woes 
The Ukrainian Minister of Defense, Oleksandr Kuzmuk, announced that despite 
current budget difficulties and a shrinking GDP, there will be no reduction in the 
two branches of armed forces. Instead, the structure of the Ukrainian military will 
be rearranged and the bureaucratic apparatus reduced. (Radio Ukraine World 
Service, 1600 GMT, 29 Jan 98; FBIS-UMA-98-029) 
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'Peace Shield 98' scheduled for August  
As part of a NATO peacekeeping exercise, Ukrainian and Russian troops will for 
the first time take part in a joint military exercise. The maneuvers, titled "Peace 
Shield 98," will be held in Yarvorov, near Lvov, from 15 to 30 August. Seventeen 
other counties will also join the exercise, of which the majority are vying for 
NATO membership, including the Baltic states, Georgia, Moldova, Romania and 
Bulgaria. 
 
Ukraine in violation of PACE membership terms 
The expansion of Ukraine's membership privileges in the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe has been jeopardized by the country's refusal 
to obey a moratorium on the death penalty, which is one of the conditions of 
PACE membership. Executions were carried out in the Ukraine in 1996 and 
1997. PACE leaders have said that they will not expel Ukraine from the 
organization for noncompliance, since they hope eventually to convince the 
country to follow their obligations. Further, the council will still consider expanding 
Ukraine's privileges before PACE's spring session. (ITAR-TASS, 1907 GMT, 26 
Jan 98; FBIS-SOV-98-02) 
 
BELARUS 
Milosevic, Lukashenka and Yel'tsin: Future comrades in arms? 
During a visit to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Belarusian President 
Alyaksandr Lukashenka said: "What we have agreed on in talks with Yugoslav 
President Slobodan Milosevic...is approximately what we have (i.e. the Union 
Treaty) between Russia and Belarus." (Interfax, 1249 GMT, 29 Jan 98; FBIS-
EEU-98-029) He hinted that the three may arrange talks in the near future. 
 
Belarus loses its Council of Europe membership 
In January Belarus' special status in the Council of Europe was suspended due 
to its history of human rights violations. However Leni Fischer, chairwoman of the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), said that the 
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organizations will keep the lines of communication with Belarusian authorities 
open. She also urged them to "strengthen relations with their neighbors," Russia, 
Ukraine and the Baltic states. (ITAR-TASS, 1808 GMT, 26 Jan 98; FBIS-SOV-
98-026) 
 
Common code of law for Russia and Belarus by 2000? 
Russian Minister of Justice Sergei Stepashin said that the Russia and Belarus 
should be able to set up a union justice ministry in the next two years, with a 
singular set of legislation, as called for in the Union Treaty. However, his 
Belarusian partner in the negotiations, Prime Minister Sergei Ling, said that 
unified legislation was a "far off goal." (Interfax, 0809 GMT, 19 Jan 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-019) 
 
ORT journalists convicted 
President Lukashenka described the sentences given to ORT journalists--Pavel 
Sheremet and Dmitri Zavadsky as--"mild." The two were allegedly caught illegally 
crossing the Lithuanian-Belarusian border and were sentenced to two and one 
and a half years respectively. (ITAR-TASS, 1442 GMT, 29 Jan 98; FBIS-SOV-
98-029) 
 
While the trial was still in progress the two journalists' defense lawyers said that 
they would seek to have President Lukashenka charged for interference. They 
claim that he violated Article 172 of the Criminal Code, which states that 
"interference in a verdict on a criminal case is an abuse of office." In the days 
before the trial opened Lukashenka had said that "in time we will be able to call 
Sheremet simply a criminal." 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 




NRC reconvenes, government continues to fulfill peace agreement 
Tajikistan's National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) returned to its work on 23 
January, following a flurry of meetings between President Rahmonov, United 
Tajik Opposition (UTO) leader and NRC Chairman Said Abdullo Nuri, and a 
contact group made up of representatives from the peace agreement's guarantor 
countries (these include Russia, Iran, Uzbekistan, Ukraine), the UN, and the 
OSCE. UN Special Envoy Gerd Dietrich Merrem met separately with both 
Rahmonov and Nuri in order to persuade the two men to sit down together and 
discuss ways of resolving their differences. Merrem's efforts were successful; the 
Tajik president and opposition leader held a two-hour meeting on 21 January in 
Dushanbe, at which Nuri declared his willingness to compromise. He also agreed 
to engage in further dialogue with the president in order to address the UTO's 
charges against the government peacefully and put the implementation of the 
peace process back on track (Interfax, 1329 GMT, 21 Jan 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
021). 
 
President Rahmonov was given an opportunity to air his own grievances against 
the UTO on 17 January, before a meeting of the international contact group. The 
president's main complaints centered around the UTO's shortcomings in carrying 
out the terms of the military protocol outlined in the peace agreement. He 
charged that UTO members continued to violate the terms of this protocol by 
hiding and refusing to register their weapons and by recruiting new members to 
its military units even after the peace agreement had been signed. According to 
Russia's Ambassador to Tajikistan, Yevgeni Belov, the Tajik president was able 
to refute nearly all of the UTO's charges against him, implying that the 
opposition's withdrawal from the NRC occurred on frivolous grounds. Belov 
further stated that the members of the contact group felt that they should actively 
aid the Tajik government and UTO in the implementation of the peace 




When the NRC reconvened on 23 January with all 26 delegates present, the 
members of the contact group were also in attendance (ITAR-TASS World 
Service, 1006 GMT, 23 Jan 98; FBIS-SOV-98-023). President Rahmonov and 
Said Abdullo Nuri held their second meeting later that day and were able to 
resolve a number of issues. The Tajik president again agreed to grant UTO 
deputy leader Haji Ali Akbar Turajonzoda (still living in exile in Iran) the post of 
deputy prime minister and allowed his decision to be announced to the press 
(Interfax, 1834 GMT, 23 Jan 98; FBIS-SOV-98-023). President Rahmonov also 
promised to grant amnesty to all of the UTO leaders (including Said Abdullo Nuri 
and Haji Ali Akbar Turajonzoda) who were convicted on charges of civil 
resistance in 1993 (Interfax, 1548 GMT, 26 Jan 98; FBIS-SOV-98-026). Nuri, for 
his part, agreed to obtain the speedy release of the remaining prisoners held by 
UTO commanders, to hasten the process of the UTO troops' registration, and to 
order the dismantling of opposition checkpoints which still exist east of Dushanbe 
(Interfax, 1834 GMT, 23 Jan 98; FBIS-SOV-98-023). 
 
President Rahmonov and Tajikistan's Prosecutor General, Salomiddin Sharopov, 
attended the NRC's next meeting on 26 January, at which Sharopov announced 
that the criminal cases stemming from 1993 against Nuri, Haji Turajonzoda, and 
the other UTO leaders had been dropped and that they were officially amnestied 
(Interfax, 1548 GMT, 26 Jan 98; FBIS-SOV-98-026). 
 
On 27 January the peace process advanced an additional step, when Deputy 
Prime Minister Abdurahmon Azimov informed the members of the NRC's Military 
Subcommission, as well as the chairmen of Kofarnihon and Lenin districts, that 
the sites for the stationing and retraining of UTO troops are completely ready for 
the troops' arrival (Khovar, 1145 GMT, 27 Jan 98; FBIS-SOV-98-027). The 
preparation of training camps for those UTO troops which have been registered 
and disarmed is another measure which is called for in the military protocol of the 
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peace agreement, and the Tajik government's failure to comply with this measure 
was one of the reasons for the UTO's withdrawal from the NRC on 15 January. 
 
UTO troops finally to return home from Afghanistan? 
135 UTO troops have assembled in the Afghan town of Taluqan, in accordance 
with the terms set out in the military protocol of the inter-Tajik peace agreement, 
in preparation for their return to Tajikistan via the Nizhnii Pyandzh checkpoint. 
According to a source in the UN observer mission who passed this information 
on to Interfax on 29 January, the troops and their commanders were flown to 
Taluqan from Nusay (1 km south of the Afghan-Tajik border) in helicopters 
provided by General Ahmad Shah Mas'ud. Some UTO troops remain in Nusay; 
they are to travel to Taluqan on foot (the military protocol stipulates that they may 
reenter Tajikistan only from the Afghan towns of Taluqan and Konduz). The 
troops are carrying only small arms. Their heavy weapons are stationed in an 
area located approximately 320 km east of Taluqan, and will be moved into 
Tajikistan much later (Interfax, 1418 GMT, 29 Jan 98; FBIS-SOV-98-029). 
 
Russian prime minister sends Gazprom delegation to Tajikistan 
On 22 January, less than ten days after Russian Prime Minister Viktor 
Chernomyrdin's visit to Tajikistan on 14 January, the Russian government sent a 
Gazprom delegation to meet with Tajikistan's Oil and Gas Committee, in order to 
discuss the establishment of joint Russian-Tajik ventures in the republic's fuel 
industry. The delegation's main task was to collect data on present conditions in 
Tajikistan's oil and gas industry and then report their findings to Gazprom's 
Chairman of the Board, Rem Vyakhirev, as well as to Prime Minister 
Chernomyrdin himself. The Gazprom delegation hoped to be able to sign its first 
joint venture agreement with the Tajik government by the end of January. Tajik 
Prime Minister Yahyo Azimov happened to be visiting Moscow at the time of the 
delegation's fact-finding mission to his republic, and so could have signed 
immediately a joint venture agreement on behalf of his government (Khovar, 




The Gazprom delegation's findings have so far not been reported in the press, 
nor has the Tajik government announced the signing of a joint venture 
agreement with the Russian joint-stock company. Such an announcement may 
come in the near future, however, since one of the topics of Prime Minister 
Chernomyrdin's discussion with President Rahmonov was the repayment of 
Tajikistan's $300 million debt to Russia. The terms of the debt repayment have 
not yet been set. Prime Minister Chernomyrdin also discussed the possibility of 
granting additional state credits to the Tajik government to be used by its armed 
forces (ITAR-TASS, 1053 GMT, 14 Jan 98; FBIS-SOV-98-014). The Russian 
government may be hoping to finance these new credits, as well as Tajikistan's 
current debt, at least in part with oil and gas deals which give extremely favorable 
terms to Gazprom. 
 
UZBEKISTAN 
President strengthens ties to Tajikistan 
President Karimov received his Tajik counterpart, Emomali Rahmonov, for a one-
day working visit to Tashkent on 4 January. The two men signed a number of 
intergovernmental agreements, the most significant of which dealt with the issues 
of Tajikistan's $180 million (as of 1 January 1997) debt to the Uzbek government 
and mutual payments for supplies of gas and other goods in 1998 (Interfax, 1459 
GMT, 4 Jan 98; FBIS-SOV-98-004). However, at a news conference following his 
meeting with President Rahmonov, the Uzbek president's main concern was not 
debt settlement, but the threat of Islamic extremism emanating from Tajikistan 
and Kyrgyzstan. President Karimov has blamed the violence which broke out in 
the Uzbek town of Namangan (and during which several police officers were 
killed) on Muslim Wahhabi extremists who have been receiving terrorist training 
in eastern Tajikistan and in the Osh district of Kyrgyzstan. The Uzbek president 
voiced his belief that this attack was linked to the 22 December attack on a 
Russian army unit in Dagestan, which Russian law enforcement agencies blame 
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on Wahhabis. President Karimov described these attacks as part of a struggle for 
power (presumably on the part of Islamic extremists throughout Central Asia 
and/or the CIS), and he expressed concern over the Tajik opposition's intentions 
for Tajikistan's political future. An Islamic regime in Tajikistan would pose a 
considerable danger to Uzbekistan's population, the Uzbek president explained 
(Interfax, 1519 GMT, 4 Jan 98; FBIS-SOV-98-004). 
 
Comment 
UTO leaders Said Abdullo Nuri and Haji Ali Akbar Turajonzoda have repeatedly 
stated that they have no intention of attempting to impose an Islamic state in 
Tajikistan. They both support the establishment of a democratic regime, based 
on popular elections. They have admitted that they are not averse to the eventual 
establishment of a state based on Islamic rule in Tajikistan, but only if the 
republic's citizens vote such a regime into power in democratic elections and/or 
by way of a referendum. Thus, President Karimov can put his fears to rest about 
the UTO's intentions for Tajikistan's future, unless his real concern is not that 
Tajikistan might be transformed into an Islamic state, but into a genuinely 
democratic state, while political freedom in Uzbekistan is still quite restricted. 
 
It is also interesting to note that it was the ostensible threat of Islamic extremism 
from Afghanistan and Tajikistan that prompted President Karimov to lobby so 
strongly for CIS intervention in the Tajik civil war in 1992-93. One could speculate 
that his recent recycling of this theme is connected to the fact that a new coalition 
government may soon be formed in Tajikistan which is to share power with UTO 
leaders, but which as of yet has made no provisions to allocate positions to the 
Uzbek-backed Khujandi faction. President Karimov may be once again 
attempting to increase his government's influence over Tajikistan's affairs by 
destabilizing the inter-Tajik peace process with accusations that the UTO is an 
extremist Muslim organization with links to "Wahhabi terrorists" (thereby causing 
President Rahmonov to halt the government's implementation of the measures 
called for by the peace agreement) and/or by putting economic on President 
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Rahmonov's administration, through the issue of debt restructuring, to procure 
Tajik government posts for Khujandi politicians. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Kate Martin 
 
ESTONIA 
Two-thirds of Russian citizens living legally in Estonia 
Apparently, only two-thirds of Russian citizens living in Estonia are doing so 
legally. According to the Russian Embassy in Tallinn, as of 1 January there were 
125,091 Russian citizens living in Estonia. However, Andres Kollist, the head of 
the Estonian Citizenship and Migration Department, stated that by the same date 
his department had issued residence permits to 88,683 holders of Russian 
passports. (Baltic News Service Daily Report, 1900 GMT, 7 Jan 98) According to 
Interior Minister Robert Lepikson, nearly 70,000 illegal immigrants may be living 
in Estonia. (Radio Tallinn Network, 1800 GMT, 13 Jan 98; FBIS-SOV-98-013) 
While the number of illegal residents may be high, the population of Estonia as a 
whole has dropped below 1.5 million. However, the percentage of Estonians is 
on the rise, from 61.5 percent in the 1989 census to 65 percent at the beginning 
of 1997. (BNS, 1100 GMT, 6 Jan 98) Part of the increase is due to the addition of 
naturalized citizens, although that rate also is decreasing: While 22,772 persons 
received Estonian citizenship in 1996, only 8,132 were granted citizenship last 
year. All told, more than 115,000 persons have become naturalized citizens since 
1991. (BNS, 1100 GMT, 2 Jan 98) Still, the numbers of new citizens may 
increase as regulations are relaxed according to suggestions from the OSCE 
(please see earlier Editorial Digests). 
 
LATVIA 
Russian speakers continue to provoke debate 
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Estonia is not the only Baltic state receiving OSCE input. Russia's deputy prime 
minister, Valeri Serov, has promised that the OSCE and Russia will coordinate 
their positions regarding observance of the rights of Russian speakers in Latvia. 
According to Serov, in a meeting with the High Commissioner for National 
Minorities, Max van der Stoel, Serov was told that the OSCE supports the 
revocation of some Latvian laws which apply to the Russian-speaking population 
and that the organization will announce new proposals on this issue in the spring. 
(Radio Riga Network, 1700 GMT, 26 Jan 98; FBIS-SOV-98-026) 
 
While Serov did not specify to which laws van der Stoel referred, in the past the 
OSCE commissioner--as well as other European bodies such as the EC--has 
discussed the need for changes in the citizenship law and naturalization issues. 
While the government of Guntis Ulmanis and the parliamentary faction 
Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK see no need to amend the citizenship law, the 
parties have agreed to launch a debate on ways to increase the speed of the 
naturalization process as well as to meet the concerns of non-citizens. (BNS, 
1100 GMT, 8 Jan 98) 
 
Even with difficulties in the process, however, the number of persons who 
obtained citizenship through the naturalization process last year reached 2,994, 
according to Eizenija Aldermane, the head of the naturalization department. Less 
than five percent of applicants were denied due to insufficient knowledge of 
Latvia or Latvian, the department reported. (BNS, 1100 GMT, 21 Jan 98) 
Aldermane estimated that approximately 121,000 persons who were eligible to 
apply for naturalization in 1997 did not do so. (BNS, 1700 GMT, 8 Jan 98). While 
a small percentage stumbled over the language and history requirements, others 
may have faced unofficial obstacles: The Latvian government has been 
significantly slower than its neighbor to the north when it comes to 
accommodating non-Latvians. Whereas Estonia has worked to meet almost all of 
the OSCE's recommendations concerning citizenship issues, Latvia has 
steadfastly refused to amend its law. More than likely, the attitude that the 
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citizenship process for non-Latvians should not be easy is prevalent throughout 
the governmental bureaucracy: In 1997, the State Human Rights Office received 
3,120 complaints, many concerning the activity of the Citizenship and 
Immigration Department. Unfortunately, no breakdown on the number of 
complaints per government departments was provided. (BNS, 1100 GMT, 6 Jan 
98) 
 
The Latvian government does intend to react to another concern voiced by the 
OSCE, namely that of the large number of stateless persons in the country. The 
head of the Citizenship and Migration Administration, Ints Zitars, reported that the 
government plans to grant such persons that status of non-citizen. In 1995, 
Latvian law accorded the status of non-citizen only to those persons who were 
registered residents of Latvia prior to July 1992, which resulted in several 
hundreds of residents lacking official status. (BNS, 1900 GMT, 12 Jan 98) Those 
who would be affected by an amendment to the law would be persons who 
moved to Latvia between 1992 and 1995, persons who arrived in Latvia for short-
term labor, and homeless persons without any place of registration. 
 
LITHUANIA 
In Lithuania, the debate revolves around Polish speakers 
In Lithuania, the situation of Russian speakers is causing less uproar than is the 
situation of Polish speakers. In December 1997, the Vilnius Region local 
government resolved that Polish could be used in all of the region's institutions 
and organizations alongside the state language. Moreover, written public 
announcements could be written in Polish, Russian, Belarusian, Ukrainian, 
Yiddish, Tatar and other non-state languages, provided such writing was not 
larger than the state language. That decision, however, caught the attention of 
higher authorities, who may be more concerned with the letter of the law than the 
practical application of same. The governor of Vilnius region, Alis Vidunas, 
suspended the 22 December decision, citing a violation of the law on state 
language, which specifies that languages other than Lithuanian may be used 
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only in non-governmental institutions. On 7 January the local government board 
confirmed its earlier decision to allow multilingual options. (BNS, 1700 GMT, 8 
Jan 98) Five days later Vidunas issued a decree restating his position that the 
local decision was unconstitutional. (BNS, 1100 GMT, 14 Jan 98) 
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